ABOARD THE EML SAKALA IN THE BALTIC SEA — On Thursday, the crew aboard the Estonian minehunter EML Sakala navigated the cold, gray waters of the Baltic Sea, remaining vigilant for any vessels exhibiting suspicious behavior such as slowing down unexpectedly or altering their course suddenly.
Equipped with binoculars and high-powered cameras, the crew meticulously recorded the names of passing ships while inspecting them for signs of tampering like missing anchors or dragged cables. Over the course of a week, the Sakala has approached close to 200 vessels while on its duty.
This minehunter is one of three Estonian navy ships participating in enhanced naval patrols orchestrated by NATO allies due to concerns that arose after damage occurred to the Estlink-2 power and communication cables linking Finland and Estonia on December 25. This incident followed the damage of two additional undersea data cables the month prior.
Initial suspicions pivoted toward Russia; however, no conclusive evidence has been found, and the Kremlin has denied any responsibility for destroying these crucial infrastructures that facilitate power and communication for numerous Europeans.
These events serve as a crucial examination of the West’s commitment to counteracting what appears to be a series of sabotage incidents in Europe attributed to Russian activities in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “The primary goal is to demonstrate strength,” shared Lt. Cmdr. Meelis Kants of the Estonian navy aboard the Sakala.
Following the disruption of the Estlink-2 cable, the Finnish police and coast guards detained the oil tanker Eagle S, which had just departed from a Russian port under suspicion of dragging its anchor and thus damaging the power and telecommunications cables.
Flagged in the Cook Islands, the Eagle S is presumed to be part of a clandestine fleet operated by Moscow to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil exports, according to Finnish officials. The tanker, carrying 35,000 tons of crude oil, is believed to have left a dragging trail of nearly 100 kilometers (about 62 miles) on the seabed before being stopped and escorted to a nearby Finnish port.
Although the Estlink-2’s damage—which is vital for supplying nearly half of Estonia’s winter electricity needs—did not immediately disrupt service, the incident caused a spike in energy prices across the Baltic region. This 90-mile (145-kilometer) undersea cable is situated at depths reaching 90 meters (295 feet) and traverses one of Europe’s most congested shipping lanes. Repair expenses could reach tens of millions of dollars, with estimates suggesting a completion date could extend into late summer, as indicated by Finland’s electricity grid operator.
The underwater cables and pipelines that span the Baltic Sea are essential for connecting Nordic, Baltic, and central European nations, bolstering trade, energy security, and reducing reliance on Russian energy supplies in some aspects.
Since the beginning of 2023, there have been ten reported incidents involving damaged cables in the Baltic Sea, impacting Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Lithuania. At least two of these events involved vessels later accused of dragging their anchors.
Maj. Gen. Andrus Merilo, who commands the Estonian military, emphasized the heightened contention in maritime areas due to their strategic significance, asserting that Western nations must adopt a more proactive stance to deter suspicious activities.
The disruption to the Estlink-2 cable followed closely after the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese vessel, reportedly damaged submarine connections between Sweden and Lithuania, as well as Finland and Germany shortly after departing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga. The ship was apprehended by the Danish navy and remained idle in a Danish shipping lane for a month before resuming its trip after inspections by both Western officials and Chinese representatives, details of which have not been disclosed.
Notably, in October 2023, another Chinese-registered ship was implicated in the severing of a gas pipeline and fiber-optic cable linking Finland and Estonia. This vessel was not intercepted and continued its route without incident.
Russian shadow fleets, comprised of vessels with indistinct ownership intended to ferry oil while evading Western sanctions, are of special interest to naval monitoring efforts. Recently, the U.S. government announced fresh sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector, which included measures directed at over 180 vessels suspected of belonging to this shadow fleet.
Finnish authorities reported that the Eagle S had several infractions related to fire safety, navigation instruments, and the ventilation of its pump room, barring it from sailing until repairs are made. Additionally, shipping news outlet Lloyd’s List noted that the Eagle S was previously equipped with surveillance devices to monitor naval activities—a rarity among merchant vessels.
The backdrop of Baltic Sea incidents contributes to rising allegations of Russian sabotage, hostile acts, and assassinations across Europe, particularly escalating following the invasion of Ukraine.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson articulated the nature of such attacks, noting they often remain obscured initially, creating confusion regarding if the activities are accidental or hostile. The underlying intent, he asserted, is to instill fear and provoke political disarray.
While European authorities have recently taken stronger action against suspected sabotage vessels, they have refrained from attributing blame directly to Moscow without definitive evidence.
Following the Estlink-2 incident, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, remarked that the “sabotage attempts in the Baltic Sea are not isolated but part of a broader coordinated strategy to undermine our digital and energy frameworks.” Finnish President Alexander Stubb and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have similarly indicated that repeated incidents in the Baltic Sea likely point to a deliberate pattern.
The need for the West to interpret these actions as preparation for “the next phase of escalation” from Russia was emphasized by Merilo, who advocated for a more robust response, stating, “We possess some evidence; while it may not be indisputable, it must be considered within the context of ongoing operations.”
To effectively counter potential threats from hostile entities, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre believes European nations should tackle challenges in tandem with their collective security under NATO, declaring it a united concern.
In December, the Joint Expeditionary Force, comprising ten European nations, including Nordic and Baltic countries alongside the U.K., Iceland, and the Netherlands, pledged to heighten cooperation against Russia’s shadow fleet activities. Maritime authorities were instructed to demand proof of insurance from potentially suspicious vessels traversing Northern Europe, although such oversight did not suffice to halt the Eagle S.
Moving forward, nations will implement an AI-supported program to aid in risk assessment and monitor vessels, establishing a mechanism to alert NATO of any suspicious activity.
Even with NATO members securing the Baltic Sea following Finland and Sweden’s accession post-invasion, crucial cables and pipelines lie in shallow waters, making them vulnerable to potential sabotage from passing ships.
During its surveillance missions, the Sakala observed a vessel traveling from Finland to the U.K. as well as a cargo ship flagged in Antigua and Barbuda that was en route from Vyborg, Russia, to Gdansk, Poland.
Should any further damage occur to the remaining power cables, Estonia would face significant challenges, primarily depending on domestic energy sources, leading to a rise in costs for consumers, thereby escalating pressure on the government—a scenario that could benefit Moscow.
Kants underscored the importance of defending the Baltic Sea, stating, “We must be present here.”
