The jihadi factions that have recently ousted Syrian President Bashar Assad are now expressing ambitions to establish a unified, inclusive nation. However, almost 14 years into a brutal civil war, actualizing this vision poses considerable challenges. For Syria’s Kurdish population, regarded as America’s primary ally in the region, the situation is evolving into an even more precarious phase.
Throughout the civil conflict, Kurdish forces have successfully resisted various armed groups, collaborated with the United States to dismantle the Islamic State, and established a largely self-governing area in the oil-rich eastern regions of Syria. Yet, their recent achievements are increasingly threatened. As Sunni Arab insurgents, who played a crucial role in Assad’s removal—with significant assistance from Turkey, which has long been hostile toward the Kurds—rise to power, the Kurdish quest for a place in the reshaped Syria could encounter substantial hurdles and potentially extend the ongoing strife.
This weekend, the jihadi rebels that advanced into Damascus made gestures toward peace with the Kurds. However, just days after the Syrian government forces retreated, these same rebels forcibly expelled Kurdish fighters from the eastern city of Deir al-Zour. In the northern regions, another faction backed by Turkey, known for its ongoing conflicts with the Kurds, captured the town of Manbij, and Turkey conducted airstrikes against a Kurdish convoy alleged to be transporting confiscated weapons.
For years, the Kurds have relied on American support amid these adversities. Around 900 U.S. troops are stationed in eastern Syria, working alongside Kurdish groups to thwart a resurgence of the Islamic State. Nevertheless, with the inauguration of president-elect Donald Trump, who has consistently questioned U.S. involvement in Syria, the future of this initiative remains uncertain.
To understand the Kurdish fighters aligned with the U.S. in Syria, it’s essential to recognize their unique position. The Kurds represent one of the world’s largest stateless ethnic groups, totaling approximately 30 million and residing across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. They are minority groups in these nations and have frequently faced oppression, which has catalyzed uprisings. In the early stages of Syria’s civil war, the Kurds carved out an autonomous enclave, neither completely backing the Assad regime nor the opposing factions aiming to overthrow him.
In 2014, amidst the Islamic State’s seizure of a significant portion of Syria, Kurdish forces—who encompass secular elements, including female combatants—demonstrated their capability in the initial confrontations against the extremists, garnering support from the U.S.-led coalition. They established the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which incorporates Arab militants, and effectively retook vast territories from the Islamic State with assistance from coalition airstrikes and American special forces. A significant victory was the capture of Raqqa in 2017, the capital of the Islamic State’s declared caliphate.
Turkey’s opposition to the Kurds stems from perceiving the SDF as an affiliate of the long-standing Kurdish insurgency within its boundaries. Ankara deems the primary Kurdish faction a terrorist entity comparable to the Islamic State and has demanded their exclusion from any future Syrian governance structure.
In recent years, Turkey has trained and financed groups trading under the name Syrian National Army (SNA), aiding them in seizing Kurdish-held territories in northern Syria along the Turkish frontier. Though the SNA purports to be part of the opposition against Assad, analysts suggest their motives are largely opportunistic, fueled by hostilities toward the Kurdish populace.
The Kurds have been preoccupied with confronting the SNA but may face new challenges from the Assad regime as they maintain ties with Turkey. As the Syrian rebels reassess their view of the Kurdish fighters, Ahmad al-Sharaa, leading the main rebel faction, aspires to construct a liberated Syria accommodating various religious and ethnic communities.
Observing the current trends, experts like Nawaf Khalil from the Center for Kurdish Studies indicate that early signs seem hopeful, particularly as rebels bypassed two SDF-controlled enclaves in Aleppo during their recent offensive. However, sentiments toward the Kurds may shift as the conflict evolves.
The potential for future clashes looms as recent statements from rebel factions suggest an intention to expand into Raqqa and eastern Syria. Collaboration with the Kurds could be possible if the rebels aim to integrate them into a new governing framework, yet this would necessitate recognizing some level of Kurdish autonomy—a prospect that could antagonize Turkey, now emerging as a dominant influencer in the Syrian arena.
As for U.S. support under the Biden administration, recent interactions between the top U.S. military commander in the Middle East and SDF representatives illustrate ongoing commitment to the alliance in a post-Assad context. However, with the approaching transition to Trump’s leadership, the fate of U.S.-Kurdish relations hangs in the balance.
Trump has elucidated little about his Middle Eastern policy, expressing a desire to cease the region’s conflicts and minimize American involvement. Notably, he previously remarked on social media that the chaos in Syria was not the U.S.’s fight. During his earlier presidency, he drew criticism for abandoning the Kurds ahead of a Turkish offensive, an action perceived as a betrayal of allies. After receiving backlash, he later authorized a broader mission to safeguard oil reserves in eastern Syria, maintaining an ongoing military presence and alliance.
