Iran’s nuclear program continues to be a primary concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly as any potential deal with the United States would necessitate the involvement of the agency, renowned as the United Nations’ nuclear inspector.
This week, Western nations aim to propose a resolution at the IAEA’s Board of Governors, condemning Iran for noncompliance with inspections and potentially advancing the issue to the U.N. Security Council.
Absent a U.S. agreement, Iran might confront “snapback”—the reapplication of all U.N. sanctions initially lifted by the 2015 nuclear agreement if any Western party declares Iran out of compliance.
This development sets the scene for a potential escalation with Iran amid the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, such as Israel’s military activities in Gaza.
The IAEA’s efforts will inevitably elevate the Vienna-based agency’s role as a crucial player in these proceedings.
Understanding the IAEA, its inspections of Iran, and the surrounding agreements and risks remain crucial in this context.
The concept of “Atoms for Peace” led to the creation of the IAEA in 1957, conceived from a 1953 U.N. address by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He advocated for an agency to monitor global nuclear resources to secure that mankind’s thematic-made progress serves life rather than destruction.
The IAEA’s role includes verification of declared nuclear inventories from its member states, classified into three categories.
The majority are states with “comprehensive safeguard agreements” allowing IAEA oversight over all nuclear materials and endeavors.
Additionally, there are “voluntary offer agreements” with initial nuclear powers such as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., typically covering civilian installations.
Furthermore, there are “item-specific agreements” with nuclear-armed countries like India, Israel, and Pakistan, which haven’t signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
North Korea claims withdrawal from this treaty, a stance some experts contend.
The unraveling of Iran’s 2015 nuclear arrangement with world powers, shaped under President Barack Obama, sanctioned Iran to enrich uranium to 3.67%—suitable for nuclear power plants but far below the 90% necessary for weapons-grade material.
It drastically decreased Iran’s uranium reserves, limited centrifuge usage, and placed the IAEA in charge of enhanced oversight of Iran’s adherence.
However, in 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. unilaterally, asserting that the pact fell short and neglected to address Iran’s missile ventures or backing of militants in the Middle East, igniting years of discord, including maritime and terrestrial disputes.
At present, Iran’s uranium enrichment reaches up to 60%, nearing weapons-grade levels.
This development and the capability to stockpile material enough for several bombs worry international observers, despite Iran’s claims of peaceful intentions.
The IAEA and other agencies acknowledge Tehran’s past organized weapons program until 2003.
Under the 2015 deal, Iran agreed to allow the IAEA more comprehensive access to its nuclear operations, including permanent installation of cameras and sensors at nuclear facilities.
These devices, inside metal casings sprayed with special paint to detect tampering, captured still images of sensitive sites.
Furthermore, enrichment monitors gauged uranium levels at Iran’s Natanz site.
The IAEA routinely dispatched inspectors to Iranian facilities for environmental sampling, analyzed in Austria.
Some monitoring occurred via satellite.
Post-2018, Iran restricted IAEA activities, blocking camera access and removing devices, cultivating suspicion when disputing an inspector’s alleged positive test for explosive nitrates, contested by the IAEA.
The ongoing negotiations between Iran and the IAEA have yet to reinstate full inspector access, perceived as part of a broader strategy to leverage the nuclear program against Western powers.
Currently, Iran and the U.S. have engaged in five negotiation rounds for a possible deal, with Oman mediating talks. Iran is expected to disregard an American proposal this week.
Lacking an agreement could further destabilize Iran’s economy and potentially heighten domestic unrest.
Risk remains that Israel or the U.S. might execute threatened airstrikes against Iranian facilities. Experts express concern that Tehran, in retaliation, might entirely terminate cooperation with the IAEA, exit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and expedite its nuclear armament.
A tentative deal between Iran and the U.S. might reduce imminent military pressures, with Gulf Arab countries—who criticized Obama’s dealings in 2015—favoring Trump’s approach.
Any arrangement would necessitate the IAEA’s role in confirming Iran’s compliance, while Israel, though, continues to pose an unpredictable element.
Israel, having previously targeted militants aligned with Iran, conducted its first airstrikes on Iran last year and warned of acting unilaterally as in past events in Iraq and Syria.