Druze in Syria: Navigating Government and Israeli Pressures

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    In the ever-shifting political landscape of Syria, the country’s Druze minority is once again navigating its path amidst uncertainty following the ousting of Bashar Assad. This small religious sect finds itself caught between a distrustful new Islamist-led government in Damascus and tensions with neighboring Israel, which has used the situation to justify its interventions.

    As Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities grapple with their place in a transformed nation, the transitional government has pledged inclusivity. Yet, the reins remain firmly with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group with roots in Sunni extremism due to its past association with al-Qaida, leaving many minorities wary. Hostilities have notably escalated between government forces and the Alawite minority, resulting in over 1,000 fatalities, many of whom were civilians, in Alawite strongholds along the coast.

    In contrast, the Druze, predominantly based in southern Syria, maintain cautious ties with the government, though tensions simmer under the surface. In Jaramana, Damascus, where the Druze community is significant, an incident involving the killing of a government security official by unidentified gunmen led to a wave of arrests. Israel’s offer to intervene and protect the Druze was swiftly rejected by community leaders. A subsequent event in Sweida, where an Israeli flag was displayed and quickly destroyed, further highlighted the delicate balance of peace.

    A resurgence of conflict looms as Druze militias, longstanding protectors from Islamic State fighters and smugglers, continue to exist. A newly-formed Sweida Military Council aims to coalesce these smaller groups. This ongoing cycle of mistrust and perceived government hostility exacerbates tensions.

    In the outskirts of Sweida, members of the Druze militia Liwa al-Jabal vigilantly monitor for potential threats. Their leader, identified only as Abu Ali for security reasons, emphasized the community’s focus on self-defense and expressed hopes that Druze fighters might one day reintegrate into a national army dedicated to protecting rather than oppressing its people.

    Originating as a 10th-century Ismaili offshoot, the Druze have long cherished their autonomy, having resisted both Ottoman and French domination. During the Syrian civil war, the community split between Assad’s supporters and opposition forces, with Sweida experiencing anti-government protests more recently. Despite being largely autonomous, the Druze were exempted from obligatory military service, opting instead for local militias composed of everyday citizens.

    The new government is urged to include the Druze and other minorities meaningfully in shaping a secular, democratic state. Among growing economic discontent and token inclusivity, protests against the new regime have emerged. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has reiterated promises of inclusivity but appoints confidantes while conducting a national dialogue criticized for its exclusivity.

    The sanctions imposed during Assad’s era continue to impair Syria’s recovery, leaving its new leaders struggling to gain international support for their removal. The inability to reinvigorate the economy threatens to reignite conflict, warns activists who fear a return to civil unrest.

    As Abu Ali trains new recruits, a sentiment persists: the Syrian people yearn for peace and progress over perpetual conflict. “Weapons don’t bring modernism,” he states, echoing a widespread desire for a unified Syria where sectarian strife is superseded by inclusive governance.