In the complex landscape of post-conflict Syria, the Druze minority finds itself once again at a crossroads. Historically adept at navigating the turbulent seas of Middle Eastern politics, the Druze are now seeking a path through a drastically changed national environment following the overthrow of Bashar Assad’s regime.
The Druze, a small but influential religious minority, find themselves squeezed between the controversial Islamist-led government currently in Damascus and Syria’s historically adversarial neighbor, Israel. The latter has invoked the Druze situation as justification for increased intervention in Syrian affairs.
As Syria rebuilds, many religious and ethnic minorities are concerned about their position within the new power structure. Promises of inclusivity have been made, yet the transitional government remains dominated by former Islamist insurgents, particularly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This organization, whose roots trace back to the Sunni extremist al-Qaida, has not alleviated minority fears.
A particular flashpoint has been interactions with the Alawite minority, to which Assad’s ruling family belongs. Fierce clashes have occurred, with a recent exchange in Alawite coastal strongholds resulting in significant casualties. Meanwhile, the Druze, largely situated in southern regions like Sweida, continue to maintain a cautious dialogue with the central government even as sporadic violence flares.
In Jaramana, a Damascus suburb with a significant Druze population, recent tensions escalated after gunmen killed a government security official. This led to a string of retaliatory arrests, fueling an already volatile situation. Israel responded by offering military protection to the Druze in Jaramana, a move swiftly rejected by Druze leaders. However, this was not before a symbolic act of protest saw an Israeli flag erected and promptly destroyed in Sweida, highlighting the delicate state of affairs.
The prospect of further conflict looms large, driven by longstanding suspicions between Druze factions and the government. Some factions, previously established to fend off threats like the Islamic State, have coalesced into new groups such as the Sweida Military Council. The cycle of distrust persists, with authorities viewing these groups as potential separatists, a stance only deepening Druze apprehensions.
On the outskirts of Sweida, militias such as Liwa al-Jabal keep a vigilant watch. A commander, known only as Abu Ali, stresses their defensive posture: “Our arms are for self-defense,” he assures. Many, including Abu Ali, are willing to integrate into a reformed national army, provided it serves all Syrians instead of a singular, abusive regime.
The Druze community, which traces its religious origins to a branch of Shiite Islam, embraces its independent spirit. This group has historically resisted both Ottoman and French colonial rule. The Syrian civil war, however, has seen divisions within the Druze, with some supporting Assad and others the opposition. Sweida, largely peaceful through much of the conflict, has experienced significant anti-government protests since 2023.
Despite some autonomy under Assad, the Druze now seek meaningful representation in a political system that values secularism and democracy. Calls for inclusivity ring out, as evidenced by slogans from various Druze militias.
Meanwhile, Druze leaders reject external interference, particularly Israeli, as hundreds protested against recent remarks by Israel’s Prime Minister. The community, primarily Arab, resists any accusations of wanting to secede, yet remains frustrated by a lack of meaningful economic opportunities and representation.
In promises to form an inclusive government, interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has faced criticism for assembling a leadership reflective of select confidants rather than diverse representation. Despite a national dialogue conference meant to address these challenges, skepticism persists regarding its effectiveness.
Economically, Syria’s predicament is precarious. The government struggles under ongoing international sanctions—remnants from Assad’s period—that inhibit reconstruction and integration efforts. Observers note that without easing these burdens, hopes for rebuilding infrastructure and gaining minority support remain distant.
A return to civil conflict is a stark fear, with many, such as activist Rayyan Maarouf, voicing concerns over Syria’s volatile status. Efforts continue to train new militia volunteers in defense, though the desire for disarmament and peace prevails. Abu Ali, reflecting on the broader Syrian population, highlights a desire for unity and an end to strife: “Weapons don’t bring modernism.”
As the country grapples with these intersecting challenges, the Druze, like many of Syria’s diverse communities, find themselves seeking stability amid the shifting sands of a nation in transition.
