KYIV, Ukraine — The recent surge in assaults by Moscow on Ukraine’s power infrastructure this winter has sparked increasing concern regarding the Ukrainian Energy Ministry’s inability to safeguard essential energy facilities located near nuclear power plants.
Numerous warnings over the past years have indicated the vulnerability of these sites to Russian attacks. However, the Energy Ministry’s response has been criticized as inadequate, according to current and former officials in Kyiv.
Ukraine’s energy grid has been severely compromised due to two years of relentless strikes, and as a result, the nation has become heavily dependent on nuclear power, which now accounts for more than half of its electricity production. The nuclear switchyards, which are positioned outside the perimeters of the three active nuclear plants, play a vital role in channeling electricity from reactors to the national grid, yet remain unprotected and exposed.
“These switchyards are essential for the nuclear energy framework in Ukraine, providing power to homes, schools, hospitals, and other critical infrastructure,” stated Marcy R. Fowler, who oversees research and analysis at Open Nuclear Network, a program dedicated to minimizing nuclear risks.
Fowler emphasized the dire consequences military assaults on these switchyards could have, noting that any attacks would significantly disrupt civilian life and weaken the resilience of the overall energy network.
Authorities only began implementing protective measures in the fall after receiving intelligence reports warning about possible strikes on the switchyards—a move perceived by analysts as too late to mitigate the damage.
“If two switchyards are shut down, we could face an energy supply outage lasting anywhere from 30 to 36 hours, with restrictions potentially lasting up to three weeks at best,” explained Oleksandr Kharchenko, an expert in the Ukrainian energy sector.
He highlighted that transporting and installing replacement equipment could take between three and five weeks, an untenable scenario for the population facing harsh winter conditions.
Additionally alarming is the fact that these switchyards serve another crucial purpose: supplying power to the nuclear plants from offsite sources, which is essential for cooling reactor cores and spent fuel. Any disruption in this supply chain could pose a serious threat, as repeatedly highlighted by the U.N. nuclear agency since the onset of Russian assaults in August.
Despite having backup emergency systems in place, Fowler cautioned that these are only intended for temporary use and would fall short in sustaining operations during extended outages without functional switchyards.
Lawmakers expressed their discontent with the government’s handling of these issues in a resolution last month, demanding the resignation of Energy Minister Herman Haluschenko. The document also accused him of corruption and poor oversight in the energy sector, though it remains pending parliamentary approval.
During a recent press conference, Haluschenko dismissed the allegations as manipulation and asserted that steps to enhance grid security were underway. However, he refrained from responding to direct inquiries regarding the specific protections in place for nuclear switchyards.
“Currently, there are no restrictions on our electricity supply, and we still have light,” he claimed, suggesting that fortifications were adequate in light of ongoing Russian assaults on energy infrastructure.
In November and December, Russian attacks came alarmingly close to Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, causing operational reductions at five out of nine existing reactors. Although the strikes did not directly hit the nuclear switchyards located approximately a kilometer away from reactor sites, the proximity raised significant alarms.
The responsibility of enhancing protections for nuclear and non-nuclear energy transmission substations fell to both state-regulated and private companies, with oversight from the Energy Ministry.
Three layers of protection were mandated: sandbags, followed by cement barriers designed to withstand drone attacks, and ultimately the more expensive steel-reinforced structures.
Prompted by a government decree issued in July 2023, many state energy firms began contracting to install the first and second layers of fortifications at key facilities. However, Energoatom, the state company responsible for the country’s nuclear facilities, did not initiate contracts for constructing second-layer concrete barriers until this fall, resulting in significant delays. Meanwhile, the high-voltage substation operator Ukrenergo had completed 90% of fortification work across its 43 sites.
Delays became a point of contention, as concerns about the Energy Ministry’s foot-dragging had been communicated in closed meetings and formal letters over the past year. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former head of Ukrenergo, noted that he had repeatedly reached out to the Energy Ministry regarding the urgent need for action over the last 12 to 14 months, before being dismissed in September, a move criticized as politically motivated.
Haluschenko assured that the energy situation was stable and focused on other initiatives, including advocating for parliamentary approval for expensive nuclear reactors that would take years to construct.
Repeated assurances were provided to Ukraine’s Western allies that all critical infrastructure was secure, according to diplomats familiar with the nation’s energy sector and its international financing.
Energoatom has not yet provided comments on the perceived delays, citing the sensitivity of the topic.
Ukraine raised alarms internationally regarding potential Russian assaults on nuclear infrastructure over the summer and again in December, holding an extraordinary session of the International Atomic Energy Agency following attacks that previously damaged vital electrical substations.
In December, IAEA teams assessed damage at Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine nuclear power plants, reporting on vulnerabilities stemming from repeated attacks and their implications for nuclear safety.
“We emphasized the critical importance of grid stability and its implications for the off-site power supply, which impacts nuclear safety,” noted IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. He also expressed concerns regarding the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia power plant, Europe’s largest.
The involvement of IAEA inspection teams led some Ukrainian officials to mistakenly believe nuclear sites were secured against Russian strikes, according to an official who spoke anonymously.
This misjudgment has now surfaced as a significant strategic error, raising questions among former officials like Kudrytskyi about the Energy Ministry’s lack of a swift response to many prior warnings. “Why didn’t they react?” he inquired. “I don’t have an answer to that.”
