KYIV, Ukraine — Moscow’s recent onslaughts aimed at Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure during this harsh winter have intensified criticism of the Ukrainian Energy Ministry’s inability to safeguard crucial energy facilities near nuclear power stations.
Despite numerous alerts over the past year emphasizing the potential vulnerability of these sites to Russian assaults, the Energy Ministry’s response has been sluggish, according to insights from both current and former Ukrainian officials in Kyiv.
For the past two years, relentless Russian bombardments on its electrical grid have forced Ukraine to depend on nuclear energy for over half of its electricity. Particularly at risk are the unprotected nuclear switchyards situated outside the safety perimeters of the nation’s three operational nuclear facilities, which are essential for channeling power from reactors to the broader electrical grid.
Marcy R. Fowler, who leads the research and analysis office for Open Nuclear Network—a U.S.-based organization aimed at reducing nuclear hazards—expressed profound concerns regarding these switchyards. “The switchyards that manage the electricity routing from nuclear plants are integral to Ukraine’s nuclear energy system, powering essential services such as homes, schools, and hospitals. Given Ukraine’s substantial dependence on nuclear energy, military strikes on these switchyards could have catastrophic consequences, severely disrupting civilian life and challenging the stability of the energy grid,” she stated.
It was only in the fall, following intelligence warnings of impending Russian assaults on the nuclear switchyards, that any protective measures started being implemented—a response deemed far too late by analysts.
“If two nuclear switchyards are hit, we would face a power outage lasting at least 30 to 36 hours, with a significant limitation on energy supply potentially extending for three weeks under the best circumstances,” noted Oleksandr Kharchenko, an expert in Ukraine’s energy sector. He further explained that the process of transporting and installing new equipment would span three to five weeks, a dire situation for the populace during the bitter winter months.
Compounding the issue, these switchyards also serve a pivotal function by supplying electricity to the nuclear plants from the offsite grid, critical for reactor cooling and managing spent fuel. Disruptions here could lead to disaster, a concern the U.N. nuclear agency has persistently emphasized since the onset of Russian attacks in August.
Although Ukraine’s nuclear facilities are equipped with emergency backup power systems, Fowler pointed out that these “are intended for temporary support.” She warned that “without operational switchyards, the backup systems alone would be insufficient to maintain operations or avert safety risks during prolonged outages.”
For these reasons, Ukrainian lawmakers highlighted the neglect in protecting these vital structures in a resolution calling for the dismissal of Energy Minister Herman Haluschenko last month. The resolution cited multiple grievances, including alleged systemic corruption and inadequate oversight in the energy sector, and is pending a vote from parliament.
Concerns about the tardy fortifications of nuclear switchyards have intensified as several Russian strikes in November and December nearly reached the country’s nuclear plants, resulting in power generation reductions for five out of its nine active reactors. Although the attacks did not directly hit the switchyards located approximately a kilometer away from the reactors, the proximity raised alarm.
The responsibility of fortifying energy transmission substations, both nuclear and otherwise, fell on state and private enterprises, with supervision from the Energy Ministry. The fortification plan included three levels of protection: initial sandbags, followed by cement barriers designed to withstand drone attacks, and ultimately, the more expensive iron-and-steel structures, which were less complete.
Following a government mandate in July 2023, many state energy firms began securing contracts for immediate construction of the first two layers of protection at essential power sites. The urgency to complete the work was reiterated in spring 2024.
However, the state nuclear agency Energoatom, responsible for the nuclear switchyards, did not engage contracts for the second layer of concrete fortifications until this fall. Meanwhile, the state energy corporation Ukrenergo had already accomplished 90% completion for safety reinforcements across its 43 sites.
Bidding for two nuclear facilities in Khmelnytskyi and Mykolaiv commenced in early October, with contracts for the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant trailing even further, starting only at the end of November. The anticipated completion of construction is not expected until 2026, as per contract documentation.
Concerns about substantial delays have been raised multiple times in confidential discussions and through official letters to energy officials over the past year, according to three current and former government insiders. “Over the last 12 to 14 months, we formally informed the Energy Ministry several times regarding this issue,” remarked Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former head of Ukrenergo, who was dismissed in September in what many viewed as a politically motivated decision.
Regardless of receiving repeated reassurances from Energy Minister Haluschenko that the situation was manageable, other projects—including efforts to lobby for parliamentary support for constructing expensive new nuclear reactors that might take a decade to build—seemed to take precedence.
Furthermore, Ukraine’s Western allies were continuously informed that “all” vital infrastructure was secure, as per two Western diplomats with insight into the country’s energy aid, who requested anonymity.
Neither Haluschenko, the Energy Ministry, nor Energoatom have responded to requests regarding the delays, citing the sensitive nature of the situation. Haluschenko also refrained from addressing the parliamentary resolution advocating for his removal.
During summer and again in December, Ukraine raised international alarm regarding the likelihood of Russian offensives aimed at nuclear infrastructure, emphasizing potential risks to nuclear safety. In mid-December, an extraordinary session of the International Atomic Energy Agency was convened after attacks the previous month damaged critical electrical substations, amplifying the risks of a nuclear crisis.
In December, the U.N. nuclear agency dispatched teams to inspect electrical substations at Ukraine’s Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine nuclear plants to document the destruction, collecting evidence that spotlighted vulnerabilities in the electricity grid as a result of the attacks. Director General Rafael Grossi stated that these attacks threaten grid stability and undermine the reliability of off-site power supply, posing substantial risks to nuclear safety, a concern similarly applicable to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia plant, which is Europe’s largest.
The ongoing presence of IAEA inspection teams led some Ukrainian officials to erroneously conclude that the country’s nuclear sites could not be targeted by Russian aggressors, according to a senior Ukrainian official who asked to remain anonymous for candid discussion about the delayed actions.
This oversight has highlighted a significant miscalculation. “Why didn’t they respond?” Kudrytskyi questioned regarding the Energy Ministry’s inaction amidst a string of warnings. “I truly don’t have an answer.”
