In DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, recent events have highlighted President Donald Trump’s musings over a potential “regime change” in Tehran. This contemplation arises amidst historical lessons from American endeavors to alter the Middle East through military force, offering a pointed reminder of potential pitfalls in the Iran-Israel crisis.
Trump’s recent comment on social media questioned, “If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn’t there be a Regime change???” This was following hostilities involving U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and subsequent missile retaliation by Iran targeting a U.S. base in Qatar.
In an attempt to clarify, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump’s stance remains consistent with his long-standing opposition to protracted conflicts, underscoring an “America first” approach. She hinted at potential escalated measures if Iran fails to abandon its nuclear ambitions or engage diplomatically. Leavitt also implied that a non-violent transformation could occur through internal uprising within Iran, not necessarily by U.S. intervention. She said, “If they refuse to engage in diplomacy moving forward, why shouldn’t the Iranian people rise up?”
This line of thought bears a marked departure from Trump’s prior disapproval of “stupid, endless wars,” recalling the historical precedents where American-led regime change stunted into quagmires — notably in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq after the ousting of respective governments.
The long-spun saga of past conflicts carries vital insights:
Initial victories can be deceiving, underscored by U.S. forces swiftly toppling the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime, only for the wars to drag on for years. After a brief U.S. presence dismantled enemy leadership, formidable insurgencies burgeoned, as seen when the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, and Iraq spiraling into factional strife post-Saddam.
In the current context, while Israel has primarily succeeded in diminishing Iran’s defenses and missiles, and U.S. strikes have impaired Iran’s nuclear capabilities, an entrenched military and guard forces still remain shielded. The Revolutionary Guard’s history of quelling protests indicates a tenacious guardian against regime destabilization.
The example of Libya illustrates that aerial campaigns alone rarely suffice. It took a ground push by Libyan rebels to dethrone Gadhafi, despite extensive NATO aerial bombardments. Currently, Iran lacks viable internal factions to combat the Revolutionary Guard, spelling high improbability for external forces to engage in a ground assault in such a geographically challenging nation.
Observers speculate on how Iranian civilians might react. While recent demonstrations signal dissatisfaction with governance, the 1980 Iraqi incursion saw Iranians uniting in defense of their homeland, casting doubt on similar unity today.
Exiled opposition factions often become amplified advocates of military interventions yet face sidelining by indigenous groups post-conflict, as witnessed in post-Saddam Iraq. Several large anti-regime organizations exist outside Iran but remain disconnected and unsupported domestically.
Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, might symbolize opposition, yet his association with the previous regime and foreign support make his potential leadership contentious among Iranians.
Chaos seems an almost certain prospect. Following regime collapses in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and subsequent upheavals in Syria and Yemen, power vacuums resulted in competitive armed groups capitalizing on disorder, international players fueling conflict through proxy factions, and mass civilian exoduses. New extremist factions have emerged from the ensuing anarchy.
The historic outcomes have often left behind governments plagued by corruption, dysfunction, and the stark absence of U.S. allegiance — reminiscent of Iraq post-Saddam, Libya after Gadhafi, and the resurgence of the Taliban regime, stark reminders in any contemplation of armed intervention in Iran.