TEL AVIV, Israel — An internal investigation conducted by the Israeli military concluded that Hamas executed the deadliest attack in Israel’s history on October 7, 2023, largely because the Israeli army underestimated the militant group’s intentions and capabilities. The findings, which were made public on Thursday, may compel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to pursue a more comprehensive investigation into the political strategies and decisions that led to the conflict in Gaza.
Many citizens in Israel hold the view that the failures of October 7 extend beyond military errors, attributing blame to Netanyahu for what they see as an ineffective approach to deterrence and containment. This strategy involved allowing financial transactions from Qatar into Gaza and sidelining Hamas’ rival, the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu has not admitted responsibility, stating he will address these issues only after the ongoing, but currently paused, war concludes. Public pressure for an inquiry remains strong, especially from the families of the approximately 1,200 Israelis killed in the attack and the 251 individuals taken hostage.
The military’s summary found that the region’s most advanced military failed to anticipate Hamas’ intentions and was caught unprepared for the coordinated attack during a major Jewish holiday. Israeli military chief Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi accepted accountability for the failures, acknowledging his role. Halevi, who is set to resign shortly, stated, “I was the commander on October 7th, and I carry responsibility.” His resignation was announced in January and takes effect next week.
These findings are consistent with previous analyses by officials and experts, summarized in a newly released report. One military official, who chose to remain anonymous, described October 7 as a comprehensive failure. A critical oversight was assuming Hamas, in control of Gaza since 2007, preferred governing over military aggression.
The military also underestimated Hamas’ capabilities. Planners envisioned a possible attack involving up to eight border points, but Hamas utilized over 60. Intelligence reports indicated that Hamas nearly staged this attack on three prior occasions for reasons still unclear. Hours before the attack unfolded, unusual activities, such as Hamas fighters using Israeli phone networks, suggested impending conflict.
The misperception that Hamas was uninterested in war led to missed opportunities that could have preempted the attack. Intelligence later revealed that Yahya Sinwar, who was killed last October, began planning the attack as early as 2017. Unprepared for action on a holiday, the military was overwhelmed by a barrage of rockets followed by thousands of militants infiltrating through or over the security fence, disabling surveillance and overpowering security forces.
Hamas quickly gained control over key transportation routes and overtook several military positions, including senior officers, greatly hampering Israeli command and control efforts. For roughly three hours, with minimal resistance, Hamas fighters targeted border communities and events, where most hostages were captured and most victims were killed. While there were instances of friendly fire, the number was not disclosed. Order was eventually restored, but it took days to clear the region of militant presence.
The report criticizes the military for being too complacent, failing to challenge its underlying assumptions. It suggests forming specialist units to promptly handle large-scale threats and encourages reforms in military intelligence to emphasize openness and continual learning. Though no individuals were singled out for blame, the findings are expected to prompt a military reckoning, and possibly lead to dismissals or further resignations beyond those already seen.
