MADRID — European military leaders acknowledge the challenge posed by President Donald Trump’s suggestion that NATO allies should aim to allocate up to 5% of their economic output to defense spending. This requirement would be particularly daunting for Spain, which ranks last among the 32 NATO nations in the proportion of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures, contributing only 1.28% as of last year. This is despite NATO’s commitment in 2014 for all members to target at least 2% of GDP for defense—a goal that 23 nations were expected to reach last year amid rising concerns about the conflict in Ukraine.
In response to the growing pressures of military obligations, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and his administration have asserted Spain’s dedication to European security and NATO initiatives. Since 2018, Spain has increased its defense budget by roughly 50%, raising it from 8.5 billion euros ($8.9 billion) to 12.8 billion euros ($13.3 billion) in 2023. This boost in financial resources is seen by the Sánchez government as evidence of Spain’s intent to meet NATO’s 2% target by 2029 after years of insufficient investment.
However, analysts and former officials caution that increasing defense spending further poses significant challenges for Spain, primarily due to the political unpopularity of militarization in the southern region of Europe. Historical factors, such as Spain’s dictatorship and its geographical distance from the eastern European threats, play a substantial role in shaping public sentiment. Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, a former Spanish NATO ambassador and current member of the European Parliament, explained that many European nations, including Spain, have grown accustomed to relying on the United States for their defense security since World War II.
Spain’s historical integration into NATO is also relevant here. The country became a NATO member in 1982, just a year after weathering a coup attempt by its military, and seven years post-Gen. Francisco Franco’s long-standing dictatorship. A referendum in 1986 saw a slim majority of Spanish citizens vote to remain in the alliance; however, Spain officially integrated into NATO’s military command structure only in 1999. Carlota Encina, a defense analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, notes that Spain is still a relatively “young member” of NATO.
Recent opinion polls reveal mixed feelings among Spanish citizens regarding military involvement. While a substantial majority opposed participation in the Iraq War in 2003, support for NATO has gained traction in recent years. For instance, approximately 70% of Spaniards were in favor of NATO supplying military hardware to Ukraine shortly after Russia’s invasion commenced in early 2022, according to a poll from the state-owned Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS). Yet only about half expressed support for increasing Spain’s own defense budget at that time.
Political analysts and stakeholders contend that militarization is often not a politically viable platform within Spain. Madrid is situated nearly 3,000 kilometers (about 1,800 miles) away from Kyiv, unlike Poland and the Baltic nations, which are closer to the frontline and have already surpassed the 2% spending benchmark. Ignasi Guardans, a former member of the European Parliament, pointed out that the public generally appreciates the military for its humanitarian missions, which was evident when soldiers assisted after severe flooding in Valencia last year. “The army has gained respect again, but that’s not solely linked to NATO,” Guardans remarked.
Furthermore, Spanish officials argue that a mere percentage of GDP does not adequately represent the country’s commitment to NATO or broader European security efforts. They often highlight España’s active role in various EU and UN missions as indicators of their engagement. Defense Minister Margarita Robles emphasized Spain’s status as a reliable NATO ally, noting that over 3,800 Spanish personnel are currently involved in peacekeeping missions on behalf of NATO and other organizations.
Spain actively participates in 16 international missions, contributing ground forces to NATO’s efforts in countries like Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania, as well as maintaining around 700 troops in Lebanon for the largest UN peacekeeping operation. Additionally, Spain hosts U.S. Navy bases in Morón and Rota, where advanced military assets, including AEGIS destroyers, are stationed.
Some analysts caution that the measurement of defense spending is complex, as Spain has frequently surpassed its budgeted defense figures through extraordinary spending that can exceed the official budget by up to 30%. Guardans pointed out that the process lacks transparency, complicating public understanding. Pascual de la Parte underscored that the 2% guideline should not be the sole measure for assessing defense commitments, as NATO countries differ in how they account for defense expenditures.
In conclusion, while there is a growing recognition of the need for increased defense spending in Spain, the landscape is complicated by public sentiment, historical context, and the broader political implications of militarization within the country. As Spain navigates its path forward in aligning with NATO’s expectations, it must address both domestic and international challenges in a delicate balance.
